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ABSTRACT
A considerable volume of research shows that asset prices respond to changes in the Federal
Reserve’s discount rate. While several competing hypotheses have been advanced to explain the
market’s response to discount rate announcements, comparatively little effort has been made to
differentiate among alternative hypotheses. The result isan abundance ofevidence establishing
that asset prices respond to discount rate announcements, butlittle ifany agreement about why
markets respond. This article attempts to fill a void in the literature by pointing out how
competing hypothesesdiffer and by constructing tests explicitly designed to differentiate among
competing explanations. The evidence suggest that the market’s reaction to discount rate changes
is purely an announcement effect, i.e., a reaction to new information contained in the
announcement, that the direct effect of discount rate changes on market rates is nil, that the
announcementeffect is invariant to the FederalReserve’s operating procedure and that, generally
speaking, changes in the discount rate do not signal a change in monetary policy. The
announcementeffect appears to vary with both the nature and extent ofthe information that the
announcementofa discount rate change is believed to contain.
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The discountmechanism hasbeen a focal point for many interesting monetary policy debates: the Fed’s role
as alenderoflastresort, the real billsdoctrine, the free reserves controversy, etc., andcontinues to occupy a
prominentspot in monetary policy, as witne~sed by the 11 discount rate changes since December 1990. Because
discount ratechanges are made infrequently, by sizable amounts, and are formally announced, they are newsworthy
events thatattract considerable attention. Indeed, often thereis speculation aboutwhether the Fed will changethe
discountrate and much significance is readinto changes whenthey occur.
Given the intense interest in them and their high visibility, it is not surprising that considerable effort has
been devoted to quantifyingthe effects ofdiscountrate changes on interest rates, stock prices and the exchange value
of the dollar [e.g., Waud (1970), Mudd (1979), Brown (1981), Thornton (1982, 1986, 1994), Roley and Troll
(1984), Smirlock and Yawitz (1985), Batten and Thornton (1984, 1985), Cook and Hahn (1988), and Hakkio and
Pearce (1992)1. While several hypotheses about why markets respond to discountrate changes have been advanced,
comparatively little work has been devoted to distinguishing among them. The result is an abundance ofevidence
establishing that asset prices respond to discount rate changes, but little agreement about why markets respond.
One reason for the lack of a consensus is that varioushypotheses are often advanced on their own merit.
Researchers present evidencethat isconsistent with their hypothesis, but do not attempt to differentiate their
hypothesis from equally compelling alternatives. This tendency is exacerbated by the lack ofspecificity about
exactly how and why competinghypotheses differ and by the fact that some alternatives are observationally
equivalentwith respect to a givenset ofempirical evidence.
This paperattemptsto fill this void by differentiating among alternative hypotheses of the effect ofdiscount
ratechanges on market interest rates, and by presenting evidence from tests specificallydesigned to differentiate
among competing hypotheses. In so doing, the literature is extended in a coupleofother directions. First, the
sample is extended to include the discount rate changes made underChairman Greenspan. Since the level of
discount window borrowing has been uncharacteristically small during the Greenspan era, the robustness of the
existing empirical results over both timeand the degree ofreliance ofdepository institutions on the discount window
2is examined. Second, theeffects ofchanges in the discountrateon the federal fundsrateand onseveral.~Treasury
rates are estimated to investigatethe robustness ofthe responseacross interest rates. Thisis importantbecause one
recently advanced hypothesis [Cook and Hahn (1988)] relies onaclosecorrespondencebetweenthe federal funds ~
rateand other short-term interest rates, and because market efficiency requires that an announcementeffect should be
reflectedin all rates simultaneously.
I. Alternative Theories ofWhy Market InterestRates
Respond to DiscountRate Changes
One reason for therelative dearthofattempts to reconcile the empirical literature on the effects ofdiscount
rate changes on market interest rates is that it is often difficult to see exactly how and why alternative hypotheses
differ. Forexample, arguing that othermarket interest rates are tied to thefederal funds rate through the
expectations theory, Cook and Hahn (1988) hypothesizethat market interest rates respond to discountratechanges
becausediscount rate changes signal achange in theFed’s target for the federal fundsrate. They argue that
permanentchanges to the level of the federal funds rateaffect longer-term interest rates in a mannerconsistent with
theexpectations theory of theratestructure. Consequently, the market’s responseto adiscountratechange is a direct
consequence ofthe Fed’s documentedattachment [Goodfriend (1991)] to federal funds ratetargeting in one form or
another.
Roley and Troll (1984) also consider the impactof discount rate changes under federal funds ratetargeting,
but arrive at theopposite conclusion——discount ratechangeshave no effect on market rates when theFed is targeting
the fundsrate. They arguethat discountratechanges affect interestrates only when the Fed is targetinga reserve
aggregate, like nonborrowed reserves. Although, Roley and Troll refer to this as an “announcementeffect”, the
mechanism that they argueproduces it is considerably different than the one thatCook and Hahn propose.
The mostobvious differenceis thatCook and Hahn assume thatdiscountratechanges signalachange in the
Fed’s target for the federal funds rate, while Roley and Troll do not; but there isamore subtle, yet critical,
difference. Specifically, Roley and Troll’s hypothesis depends critically on the directeffect of a discountratechange
on interest rates through its effecton borrowed reserves. Cook and Hahn’s hypothesis, on the other hand,operates
with or without a statistically significant directeffect: itdepends solely on an expectational or announcement effect.
3To seethe differencebetween thesetwo hypotheses it is useful toconsidera standard representationofthe
marketforreserves. The demand forreserves is given by
(I) R”=tJ(i,a), f1<0,f2>0,
wheref(i, a) represents the demand for reservable deposits, t denotes the marginalreserverequirement, idenotes the
short-term market interestrateand a denotes a vectorotherdeterminants ofthe demand forreservable deposits. The
supply ofreserves isgiven by the sum ofthe Fed’s holdings ofgovernment securities, GS, and borrowed reserves,
BR. Thedemand for borrowed reserves is given by
(2) BR = h(FR - DR), h’ > 0,
whereFR denotes the federal funds rateand DRdenotes the discountrate. To close out the model, assume that
short-term rates are related to the funds rate, i.e.,
(3) 1 = 0(FR), 0’ > 0.
Differentiatingthe reservemarket equilibriumcondition and solving foräi/~DR yields
(4) ai/aDR = (h’ 0’ - O’dGs/dDR)(h’ - rf1O‘)~.
Thedirecteffect of a discountratechangeoccurs when the Fed does nothing to offset its effect on the federal funds
rate, i.e., when dGSIdDR=0. Hence, the direct effectis,
(5) ai/~3DR= h’O’/(h’ — tf1O’) > 0.
Note that equation 5 is simply O’aFRJaDR. When theFed targets the fundsrateat somelevel, FR’, it does so by
setting its portfolioofgovernment securities equal to
(6) GS’ = tf(0(FR ‘), a) - h(FR’ - DR).
Roley andTroll argue that ifthe Fed is targeting the federal funds rate, itwill automatically offset thedirect
effect ofits discountrateaction on borrowing throughcompensating open market operations. Thatis, they assume
4that dGS’/dDR = -h’, so that t3i/3DR =0. Specifically, Roley and Troll (page 33) note that undera federal funds rate
operating procedure“an increase in thediscountrate...would resultin nonborrowed reserves increasing” to keepthe
funds rateat itstarget level. Alternatively, “Undera nonborrowedreserves operating procedure, a discountrate
change would be expected to affectinterest rates withoutanyfurther overtpolicy actions” (pages 33-4, emphasis
added). Hence, Roley and Troll argue that changes in thediscountrateaffect market interestrates through the direct
effect unless theFed acts to offset it. Consequently, an empirically significant directeffect is theessential element of
their hypothesis.
Theessential feature ofCook and Hahn’s hypothesis, however, is Equation 3, i.e., i= 0(FR*). Theyargue
that a change in thediscountratesignals a changein the Fed’s target for the federal funds rate: other rates respond to
the perceived change in the ratestructure. This would occur, even if h’ 0, or equivalently, if thediscount window
were ~ Hence, ifthe direct effectofdiscountratechanges is nil, Roley and Troll’s hypothesis is rejected, but
Cook and Hahn’s is not. Consequently, the first step in unraveling why interest rates respond to discountrate
changes is to seewhether it ispossibleto distinguish between thedirecteffect and the announcement effect
hypotheses.
II. Is There A Direct Effect Ofa Discount RateChange?
The fact that h’~0 creates the possibility for a directeffect. Aprimafacia case can be made,however,that
thedirect effectmight be so small as to be statistically insignificant. Recently Pagan and Robertson (1995) have
shown, over the period 1959 through 1993, that it takes abouta 1 percentage point increase in the average level of
nonborrowed reservesto produce abouta 13 basis point decline in thefederal fundsrate atthe monthly frequency.
Moreover, both they and Christiano (1995) show that the effectof an exogenous change in nonborrowed reserves has
been essentially non existent since theearly 1980s. Thedirecteffectdepends directly on h’, which has been
relatively small. Based on Pagan andRobertson’s estimates, it would take approximately a5 percentage point cut in
the discountrateto produceabout a 13 basis pointdeclinein the federal fundsrate, even using a very largeestimate
‘Itis neverthelesstruethat it would be easierto effect achangein the fundsratethrough thediscount rate, the largeris h’ = 0. Adiscount rate
change that signals achange in thefunds ratetarget requiresadditional openmarket operationsbeundertakento bring thefunds rateto its new
target level. This is requiredbecause ~i/äDR = I ifand only if = rf, O’(1-8’)~’.Butthis requires h’ to be large, especiallyif0’ is large. However,
theevidence[Polakoff(1960), (oldfeld and Kane(1966), Polakoff andSilber(1967),Tinsley, et. al. (1982), Thornton(1986) andClouse(1990,
1994)] is overwhelmingthat h’ is significantly less thanunity. Hence, Cook and Hahn areassuming that, under a funds ratetargeting procedure,the
Fed will undertake additional actions to raise thefunds rateto thenew target level. Incontrast. Roley and Troll assumethat theFed will undertake
oppositeactionsto offset thedirect effectofthe discount ratechange.
5ofh’ of about0.4. Moreover, the interest sensitivityofborrowing has itself become much smaller in the.1980s [e.g.,
Clouse (1990, 1994)]. Since the mid-1980s, the directeffectshouldessentially be nilbecause h’ 0.
A. The Existing EvidenceofaDirect Effect
Much of the existing evidence points to a statistically insignificant directeffect. For example, itis well
established [Thornton (1982, 1986), Smirlock and Yawitz (1985), Cook and Hahn (1988), Dueker (1992) and Batten
and Thornton (1984, 1985)] that asset pricesrespond only to discountratechanges that the Fed announces are made
for other than technical reasons, i.e., forreasons otherthan simply to keep the discount rate in line with market
interest rates. However, all discount ratechanges, regardless of the motivation for them, should have a directeffect.
Consequently,evidence that markets respond only to non-technical discountratechanges suggests that thedirect
effect is nil.2
In addition, Thornton (1986) has shown that markets respond todiscount ratechanges even during periods
when the discountrate is a “penalty rate,” i.e., whenthe discountrateis above other market interest rates. At such
times borrowing is small and should berelatively interest insensitive, so the direct effect should be small.
The differential responseof assetprices to technical and non-technical discountratechanges, however,
could stem from technical changes being anticipated while non-technical changes are not Moreover, that markets
respond to non-technical discountratechanges when the discountrate is a penalty rate merely suggests that there is
also an announcementeffect: it does not necessarily implythat there is no direct effect. Consequently, the above
evidenceis suggestive, but not conclusive.
Although limited, evidence on the predictability ofdiscount rate changes suggests that technical changes in
the discount rate are no more predictable than non-technical changes. Forexample, Hakkio and Pearce (1992) report
some in-sample success in predicting discountratechanges prior to October 1979 using a Logit model. An
examination of theirresults, however,suggests that technical changes generally were no more predictable than non-
technical changes. Likewise, Dueker (1992) found that the timing of discountrate changes were difficult to predict,
2
Notethis point is not negatedby Cook and Hahn’s (1988) hypothesis. If non-technical changesin the discount rate signal a change in theFed’s
target for thefederal fundsrate, changes in thediscount ratewould not give riseto achange in thespreadbetween thefederal funds anddiscount
rates ifthe fundsrate target wereadjusted point-for-pointwith the discount rate. In theseinstancestherecould be no direct effect on market rates.
Technical discount ratechanges, on theother hand, would have a direct effect sincethe federal funds rate would not automatically move point-for-
point with technical realignmentsofthe discount rate.
6even ata weekly frequency, and that the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated was unimpor~nt in
determining movements inthe three-monthTreasury-bill ratein responseto discountratechanges.
The mostcompelling evidencethat thedifferential responsetotechnical and non-technical discountrate
changes is duetothe predictability ofthe former is Smirlock and Yawitz’s (1985) resultthat theresponseof interest
rates to“unanticipated” discountratechanges using the technical/non-technical classification based on the statements
of the Board ofGovernors were nearly idenfical to thoseusing anticipated/unanticipated discountratechanges from
astatistical model. Smirlock and Yawitzinterpret their finding ofastatistically significant, positive correlation
between like-classifieddiscountratechanges usingthe two methods as evidencethat technical discountratechanges
have noeffect on the markets because they are anticipated.3
B. Some Additional Tests ofthe DirectEffect Hypothesis
Additional evidence on the importanceofthedirect effectcan be obtained from testsoffour basic types.
The first type is a test of Roley andTroll’s argument that theFed did not offset the direct effect of interest rates when
it wastargeting nonborrowed reserves. Iftheyare correct and there is adirect effect, the magnitudeofthe response
todiscountratechanges should be larger during theperiod from October 1979 to October 1982 when the Fed was
explicitly targeting nonborrowed reserves. At that time, theFed would have no particular reason to offsetthe direct
effect ofadiscountratechange on market rates.4 Moreover, the responseshould be invariant to thetype of discount
rate change, assuming ofcourse that both technical andnon-technical discountratechanges are equally predictable.
Conversely, if, as Cook and Hahn suggest, non-technical discount rate changes signal achange in the target
for thefunds rate, whiletechnical changes do not, the responseto non-technical changes should be largerwhen the
Fed istargeting the federal funds rate than when it is targetingreserves. In the former case both the announcement
anddirect effects would be operative, while in thelatter case only thedirect effect would matter. Hence, additional
evidence on the importanceofthe directeffectcan beobtained by investigating the magnitude oftheresponseto
technical discount rate changes overperiods offederal funds and nonborrowed reservetargeting.
3
Severalauthors, including Batten andThornton (1984, 1985), have suggestedthisinterpretation based solely on the fact that markets respond only
to unanticipated discount ratechanges.
‘Foradiscussionofchangesin theFed’soperating procedure see Feinman (1994), Feinman andPoole (1989) andThornton (1988).
7The second typeoftest isadirecttestofpredictability. If technical changes aremore predictable than non-
technicalchanges, theyshould be morereadily explainedbythe pastbehaviorofother variables. Two typesof
direct tests ofpredictability are conducted. Thefirst extends thework ofSmirlock and Yawitz (1985). Reexaminiiig
Smirlockand Yawitz’s result is importantbecausethey provide the most compelling evidencethat the failure ofthe
markettorespond to technical discountratechanges may bedue totheir being anticipated.
Asecond directtestofpredictability uses daily data to determine whethertechnical discountratechanges
aremore predictable than non-technical changes based on the past behaviorof interestrates alone.
The estimated equation is
(7) Lii, = a p(L ‘)~DRT,+ )~(Lt)~DR +
where iXi, isthe change in a market interest rate, ll(Lt) and ?.(L’) are polynomials oforder k, [e.g., li(L~’) = ji1L~’+
j.s2L2
+ ... + pkL”, in the lead operator,L’] and ADRT andi~DR~ denotetechnical and non-technical discount rate
changes, respectively. The null hypotheses ji(L’) = X(L~) = 0 can be tested for various values of k. Rejecting the
null hypothesis that p(L’) =0, but not the null that )..(L’) = 0 would support the idea that technical changes are more
easily anticipatedthan non-technicalchanges.
The third type of testis an indirecttestof predictability. Its motivation comes from noting that there are
really two distinct types ofnon-technical discount rate changes, those which include a technical component and those
which do not. Ifthe market does not respond to technical discountrate changesbecause they are predictable, it is
reasonabletoconjecture that the market’sresponseto discount rate changes that have a technical component should
be smallerthan those that do not. This possibility is investigated by testing the hypothesis that the market’sresponse
to purely non-technical discountratechanges is equal to that ofmixed technical and non-technical discountrate
changes against the alternativethat the responseto purely non-technical changes is largerthan the responseto mixed
changes.
The fourth typeoftest utilizes thefactthat the directeffect varies directly with the interest responsiveness
of borrowing. Thetest is motivated by Figure 1, whichshows monthly adjustmentborrowing, seasonal borrowing
8and the spread between the federal funds and discountrates for the period January 1973 to January 1991~There are
several interesting features ofFigure 1. First, whileadjustment borrowing is very sensitivetothe spread between
the federal funds and discountrates, seasonal borrowing appears tobe much less so. Second,sincethe mid-1980s,~
adjustment borrowing has become small. Increasingly total borrowing has been dominated by seasonal borrowing.
Third, and somewhat less obvious, isthe fact thatadjustment borrowing has been less interestsensitive since at least
the mid-1980s.
The fact that borrowing has become small and relatively unresponsive to changes in the ratespread can be
used to identify whether theresponseof interest rates to non-technical discountratechanges is due to a director an
announcementeffect Equation 5 shows that thedirect effectvaries directly with theinterest sensitivity of
borrowing. Consequently, if thedirect effectis important, the responseof market rates to changes in thediscount
rate should be much smallerduring the period since the mid-l980s, when theresponseofborrowing toachange in
the discount rate is small and statistically insignificant. A failure to find a statistically significant drop in the
responseof market rates to non-technical changes in thediscountratein thelatter period, compared with the former,
would suggest that thedirecteffect is not statistically significant. This test has the advantage that it involves only
non-technical discount ratechanges, so it is not subjectto theanticipated/unanticipateddistinction that arises in
comparisons ofthe market’sresponseto technical and non-technicaldiscountratechanges.
C. The Data
The data on interest rates aredaily for the period January 3, 1972 to January 29, 1993. Thechange in the
discountrateis the percentage-pointchange in the discount rate on the day that a discount rate change was first
announced. Four market interest rates are used: the federal funds rate, FR, and thethree-, six-, and 12-month
Treasury rates,TR3, TR6 andTR12. FR is the weighted average rate on daily transactions fora group of federal
fundsbrokers and is compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. TheTreasury rates are rates taken at
“market close,” about4:00 p.m. E.S.T. Discount rate changes are aligned with changes in market interest rates so
that the change in the relevant ratecan reflect announcements ofdiscount rate changes.
5
Theseasonal and extended credit borrowing programs came intoexistence in 1973. Consequently, no distinctionwas made between seasonal and
adjustment borrowing priorto May 1973.
9Thediscountratechanged 63 timesduring this period. Following Thornton (1982), discountratechanges
areclassified as technical, L~DRT, or non-technical,ADR~, dependingon whetherthe Fed’s announcement stated
that thechange was madesolelytokeep thediscountratein line with market rates or gave someother reason for the
change. Using this classification, therewere 23 technicaldiscountratechanges and 40 non-technical changes. The
lattergroup canbe further partitioned into thosethat are purely non-technical, i.e., thestatement that the discount
rateis changed to bring it into alignment with market interestrates is not given as oneofthe reasons for the change,
and mixed technical and non-technical, i.e., discountratechanges that aremade for both technical and other reasons.
The dates and magnitude ofdiscountratechanges and thecorresponding changes in the four market interest rates are
presented inTable 1, where discountratechanges are also identified as technical, T, purely non-technical, P, or
mixed technical and non-technical, M.
It iswell-known that the volatility ofinterest rates was unusually high during theperiod from October 1979
to October 1982 when theFederal Reserve was targeting non-borrowed reserves. In addition, the variability of the
federal funds rate increases significantly on settlementWednesdays and on the firstand last day ofthe year. The
volatility ofthe federal funds ratealso rose significantly fora short period following the Board of Governors’
decision in December 1990 toeliminate reserverequirements on all non-transactions deposits.6 The consideration of
heteroskedasticity is potentially importantbecausea given responsetoa discountratechange may be statistically
significantor notdepending on whether itoccurredduring a period oflow or high interest rate volatility.7 In the
regressions reported here heteroskedasticity is explicitly modelled.5
6
This reserve requirementchange wasnot telegraphed to banksand manyfoundtheirdeposit balancesat theFed fallbelow thelevel necessary to
servicetheir daily transactions. Thefundsratewasunusually volatile while bankssorted things Out. This increased volatilityofthefundsratedid
not carryover intotheTreasury-bill rates, however.
7
Acomparisonofstudies that only utilize observations on theday thatdiscount ratechanges occurred,e.g.. Smirlock and Yawitz (1985), Roley and
Troll (1984), Cook andHahn (1988) andWagster (1993), with thosethat utilize all dailyobservations on interestrates, Thornton(1982, 1986),
suggests that mostofthequalitative conclusionsare not affected by thisconsideration. The exception is reflected in therecentwork ofWagster
(1993) who attempts to account forthedisparity in theresults ofCook andHahn andthose ofSmirlockand Yawitz andRoley and Troll: theformer
find asignificantmarket reaction to non-technicaldiscount ratechanges prior to October1979, while the latterdo not. Wagstersurmises that the
disparity in theresultsisdueto the factthat thefive discount ratechanges made in 1973-74wereincludedin theformer’s sample,but not in the
lattefs. Partitioningthedata into sub-samples,Wagster finds no statistically significantresponse oftheTR3 to non-technicalchangesin the
discount ratefor eitherthe Smirlock andYawitz orRoley andTroll sampleperiods. He attributesthedifference in theresponsefor the periods
1973-74and 1975-79to an unspecifiedchange in “the Federal Reserve’s discount policy.” Theresult thatTR3 doesnot respond significantly to
non-technical discountratechanges in eitheroftheseperiods is due to not appropriatelyaccounting for the heteroskedasticity. Whiletheresponse
is smaller duringthe 1975-79period,it is statistically significant.
‘For~FR the variance waspermittedto bedifferent on settlementWednesdaysandThursdays (an inordinatechangeon a settlementWednesday
spills over to Thursday)and duringthe firstand last day oftheyear. The periodsfor modellingthe heteroskedasticitywerechosen fromthe
residuals from regressionsofeach rateon aconstantand technicalandnon-technical changes in the discount rate. The finalestimates weremade
10D. The Results
To testthehypothesis ofwhether the market’sresponseto discountratechanges was largerduring the
period ofnon-borrowed reserve targeting, the equation
I if 1/3/72 t 10/8/79
(8) I~si,= a + f3(L)&,~÷Ô(L)L~tFR,~ + i~4~ L!~DR~ + e, , j 2 if 10/9/79 I 10/11/82
3 if 10/12/82 t 1/29/93
was estimated, where Ai is the change in one ofthe four interest rates and ~(L)and ô(L) are ntt*~order polynomials of
the form, f3(L) = ++ t32L2
+ ... + ~ in the lag operator, L.9 Ô(L)AFR was included because theeffect ofa
change in the discountrate on marketrates is conditional on the fundsrate. Ofcourse, when I FR, ô(L) is setto
zero.
The considerationofthe variability of interest rates is particularly important for testing whether the
responseto discountrate changesis larger during the periodofnonborrowed reserve targeting. Notonly was there
greater variability aboutthe mean changein interest rates during this period, but themean absolute changein interest
rates was much largerduring this period as well. This is shown in Table2 whichpresents the average absolute
changes inthe four interest rates on days when there were no discount rate changes for periods before, during and
after nonborrowed reservetargeting. the average absolute changein the interest rates is more than 2.75 times larger
during the nonborrowed reserve targeting period than for theperiods before or after.
Given thedifference in average absolute changes in rates overthese periods, itwould hardly be surprising
to find that the changein interest rates corresponding to a percentage-point change in the discountratewere larger
during the nonborrowed reserve targeting period. Indeed, estimates of Equation 8, presented inTable 3, yield
precisely this result fornon-technical discountratechanges. A comparison ofthe relative magnitudeofthe estimated
coefficients during the nonborrowed reserve targeting period with those ofthe periods before and after suggests that
with atwo-stepgeneralized leastsquares, (ILS, procedure, e.g.,see Fomby,HillandJohnson (1984, pp. 174-76). Theestimatedstandard errors for
the varioussub-periods arereported with theregressionresults.
‘Ii(L) isincluded in thisand all other regressions to control for theeffectsofpastinformationon the interestrate. Ineverycase
n = 10, although none ofthe coefficientsarereported. The qualitative resultsare insensitive to whether thedistributed lagofthedependentvariable
is included.
11therelative magnitudeof theresponseis roughly on the order oftherelative magnitude oftheaverage absolute
changes in the rates overthese periods presented in Table 2. Hence, measured relative to the averagechange in the
rates during these periods, the responsetoa non-technicaldiscountratechange appears to be no largerduring the
period whenthe Fed was targeting nonborrowed reserves.
This observation is confirmed by the results ofestimates ofEquation 8, presented in the bottom portion of
Table 3, where the changein the interest ratehas been adjusted by the average absolutechange in the ratefor each
period.’5 Generally speaking, the coefficients for the nonborrowed reserve targeting period are somewhatlargerthan
those forthe period offunds ratetargetingprior to October 1979; however, they aresomewhat smaller than those of
the period offunds ratetargeting afterOctober 1982 forthe Treasury-bill rates, both absolutely and relativeto their
standard errors. Theevidencedoes not support the hypothesis that the responseofmarketrates to non-technical
discountratechanges was larger during the period of nonborrowed reserve targeting.” Hence, the results do not
support the notion ofan empirically important direct effect.
Moreover, theresults strongly support previous research [Thornton (1982, 1986, 1994), Smirlock and
Yawitz (1985)and Cook and Hahn (1989)] that marketsdo not respond todiscountratechanges that the Fed
announces aremade solelyto keepthe discountratein line with market interestrates.’2 Thisresult is robust, holding
up over theextended sample and over the separate periods. The factthat themarkets did notrespond to technical
discountratechangesduring the nonborrowed reserves targeting period isfurther support forthe notion that the
direct effect is nil.
Resultsofthe two direct tests forpredictability oftechnical and non-technicaldiscountratechangesare
presented in Table4. Theupper half ofthe table reports theresults from the model used by Smirlock and Yawitz
‘°This interpretation is also supportedby a comparisonofthet-statistics for thesecoefficients whichsuggests that thesize ofthe coefficient relative
to itsvariabilitywasnot significantlydifferent duringtheOctober 1979 - October 1982 period.
~The resultthat themarkets response to non-technicaldiscount ratechanges hasbeen somewhatlarger sinceOctober 1982 is somewhatofan




The third period Omits the technicaldiscount ratechange that was made on October 12, 1982. Consistent with Thornton(1986), the coefficient ~T
is statistically significant only for theTreasury rates when thisobservation is included. This is tritewhether technicaldiscount ratechanges are
partitioned,as theyare here,ornot. Inany eventthestatistically significantresponse ofTreasury-bill rates to technicaldiscount ratechanges is due
entirelyto thetechnical discountrate change on October 12. 1982. When thisobservation is deleted PT~5 not significantly different fromzero for
anyofthefour interestrates. This discount rate changewasmade only two daysafter theFed announced itsdecision to de-emphasize Ml asan
intermediatepolicy target. Thus, themarket appearsto have attributedsome significance to thischange, despitethe Fed’sannouncement that the
movewas taken solely to bringthe discount ratein line with market rates.
12(l985).’~FollowingSmirlockand Yawitz, discountratechanges are regressed on fourlags of (a) thespread between
thefederal funds rateandthe discountrateand (b) borrowing from the Federal Reserve. Since borrowing is only
available weekly, weekly averagesofdaily data are used. Acomparison of the adjusted R2 for theseequations ~
suggests that technical discountratechanges are slightly morepredictablethan non-technical changes. Moreover,
thecoefficients on thespread variableand borrowing are generally more significant for technicalchanges. While the
F-statistic for thetestof thesignificance ofthe slope coefficients is statistically significant in both specifications,the
adjusted R-squares are very small. Consequently, neither technical nor non-technical changes appear to be very
predictable. Indeed, unanticipated changes in thediscountrategenerated from this modeldiffer little from actual
discount rate changes.
The relatively poor performance ofthe model explains why Smirlock and Yawitz found little difference in
the market’s response to technical and non-technical discount rate changes based on the press releases ofthe Fed and
unanticipated discount rate changes estimated from their model. Because ofthe model’s poor performance, the
residuals from the statistical model areessentially theactual changes in the discount rate—both technical and non-
technical. Sincethe markets do not respond to technical discountratechanges, it is hardly surprising that the
coefficientresponse to unanticipated discountratechanges fromtheir statistical model was essentially the same as
that of non-technical changes. Thecoefficient on unanticipated changes in thediscountrateis the sum ofthe
coefficients on non-technical discount-ratechangesand technical discount ratechanges;the latter coefficientbeing
very close to, and statistically insignificantly different from, zero. Consequently, Smirlock and Yawitz’s result, that
the markets responseto non-technical changes is essentially the same as to unanticipatedchanges from their model,
is not compelling evidence that technical discountratechanges areanticipated while non-technicalchanges are not.
Tests of predictability based solely on interest rates are reported in the lower halfofTable 4. Theseresults
suggest that the differential responseof marketinterest rates to technical and non-technicaldiscountratechanges is
not due tothe greater predictability oftechnical discountratechanges. Joint tests of the lead coefficients are
generallysignificant for both technical and non-technical discountratechanges when the Treasury-bill rates are used.
°Smirlockand Yawitz (1985) claim that this wasthe bestofseveral alternativespecifications that they tried. Consequently, thisspecificationwas
used. 1 attemptedto replicate theirresults; however, theirdescriptionof whattheydid lackeddetail. Using periodsthat contained thenumber of
discount ratechangesthat they said they had in each period,I constructedsamples ofsizesidentical to those reportedin theirpaper, I obtained
resultsthat were fairly closeto theirs,but wasunable to replicate theirresults.
13This resultlikely reflects the tendency ofall discountratechanges—technical and non-technical—to followrather
thanlead market interestrates.14 The tests are usually significantonly fornon-technicaldiscountratechanges for the
federal fundsrate.
The finding that neither technical nor non-technical discountratechanges is very predictable is not as
surprising as it may seem. TheFed’s behaviorwith respecttodiscount rate changes has been erratic. The discount
rate has been raised when the spread ofthe funds rateoverthediscount rate was very narrow, while atother times a
spread of300 basis points or more hasfailed to provoke even atechnical discountrateadjustment. In any event, it
would bedifficult to anticipate the preciseday ofa discountratechange, so all discountratechanges should have an
important unanticipated component.
To test whethermarkets respond equally to pure and mixed non-technical discountratechanges, the
equation
(9) Lii, = a + ~(L)i~i,, + ô(L)i~XFR1
÷p~ADR~, + p,,,LDR~ ~‘
isestimated for theentire sample. EstimatesofEquation 9 are reported in Table 5. Differences in the responseto
pure non-technical and mixed discountratechangesare quite small and thenull-hypothesis, pp - PM 0, is not
rejected for any ofthe four rates)5 These results suggest that the differential responseofmarkets to technical and
non-technical discountratechanges is-notdue to the former beinganticipated. Becausethe market’sresponseis the
same to pure non-technical and mixed discountratechanges, no distinction is made between them for subsequent
tests.
Tosee whetherthe responseof interest rates to non-technicaldiscountratechanges varies directly with the
interestresponsiveness of borrowing, we firstestimated the borrowing equation,
(10) Borr, = .)~ + ?.,(FR — DR), + ?~2(FR- DR)~ +
1415 is interestingto note thatGarfinkel andThornton(1995) foundthat changesin the federal funds ratetendto followratherthanlead changes in
the three-month Treasury-billrate.
15
Cook andHahn (1988)alsopartitionednon-technical discount ratechangesinto pure non-technical and mixed. Consistentwith thefindings here
over a muchlongersample, in a footnotethey report finding no statisticallysignificantdifferencein the response ofthe federal funds rateto these
two typesofnon-technicaldiscount ratechanges.
14whereBorr is alternately adjustment borrowing and seasonal borrowing. Estimates of Equation 10 for ~eriods before
and afterJune 1984 are presented in Table6.16 June 1984 waschosen asthe break point inthe borrowing function
becauseClouse (1992, 1994) presentsevidence that suggests that thechange in borrowing behaviorwas dueto larg~e
banks staying away from the discount window in the wakeofContinental Illinois’ problemsand its largeborrowing
from the Fed. As expected, the coefficienton the rate spread is muchsmallerfor seasonal than for adjustment
borrowing, however; it is statistically significant 4uringthe first period. Estimates of theadjustment borrowing
equation shows a significant change in the behaviorof both seasonal andadjustment borrowing, with the interest
responsiveness being much smaller and not statistically significantafter mid-1984.
To test whether theresponseto non-technical discountrate changes varies directly with the interest
sensitivity of borrowing, the equation
(11) tsi, = a + ~(L)L~i,~, + ö(L)LiFR1
+ +
was estimated over periods before and after June 1984. Theresults are reported in Table 7. All ofthe coefficients
are statistically significantand, generally speaking, thedifferences in the magnitudeof theresponseare small. More
important, they arenot statistically significant. The finding that the responseofinterest rates to non-technical
changes in the discountrateis the same for bothperiods supports theconclusion that the market’sresponseto non-
technical discountratechangesdoes not vary directly with the interestsensitivity of borrowing as would be expected
ifthedirect effectwere empirically important.’7
III. What’s Drivingthe Announcement Effect?
Statistical evidence is never conclusive. The evidence presented here, however, combined with previous
evidence, overwhelmingly supports a singleconclusion: the directeffect is nil—the market’s reaction tonon~
technical discountratechanges is a pure announcement effect. But what’s behindthe announcementeffect? Broadly
speaking, two competing announcement effect hypotheses have been offered. The first, suggested by Friedman
“~The seasonal borrowing equationincluded two lagsofborrowing and 11 monthly seasonal dummyvariables.
‘
7
Thedata in Table 2suggests that theaverage absolutechange in market interestrates is largerduring the periodpriorto June 1986 than the period
since. Consequently,acomparisonof theestimated coefficients not adjusted for themean differences is not appropriate. Note,however, that the
adjustment for average absolutechange in theinterestrates over theseperiodswill raise theestimatedcoefficient forthepost-June 1986 period
relativeto thepre-June period.
15(1959), views discountrate changes as the administrativeactions ofa monetary authority who is in a unique position
tojudge thecourse ofeconomicactivity or interest rates. Marketsare hypothesizedtorespond tothe new
information about thecourse ofinterest rates oreconomic activity, whetherthe Fed is responsible for thecourse or
not.’t
The second hypothesis argues thatdiscountratechanges signal a change in monetary policy. A rise in the
discountrateis seen as a shift in monetary pblicy toward restraint, while a decrease isseen as a shifttoward ease.
These competing announcementeffect hypotheses are distinguished by the factthat the second implies that non-
technical discountratechanges signal that theFed will do something different with respect to monetary policy, while
the firstdoes not. Consequently, these competing hypotheses can bedistinguished by investigating whether non-
technical discountratechanges signalachange in monetary policy.
Unfortunately, no consensus exists aboutthe appropriate indicatorof monetary policy. The Fed’s pre-
occupation with thefederal fundsrate[Goodfriend (1991)] has motivated many researchers [e.g., Bernanke and
Blinder (1992), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991, 1992a, b), Friedman and Kuttner (1993), Kashyapand Stein and
Wilcox (1993) and Laurent (1988)] to use it as an indicator ofpolicy.
Alternatively, changes in monetary policy should be reflected in aggregates that reflectthe actions ofthe
Fed—primarily, open marketoperations. Several such aggregates have been suggested. Themost notable ofthese
are the adjusted monetary base, total reserves adjusted forreserve requirementchanges, and non-borrowed reserves.
The adjusted monetary base was designed to summarize all ofthepolicy actions of the Fed into a single measure.
Critics argue that the base islargely made up ofcurrency, which is supplied elastically, so fluctuations in it may be
due moreto shifts in currency demand (even foreign demand) than to changes in monetary policy. Since neither total
reserves nornonborrowed reserves includecurrency, they are notaffected by shifts in currencydemand. Indeed,
sincecurrency is supplied elastically, the Fed tends to keep reserves constant in theface ofshifts in the demand for
currency.
Christiano and Eichenbaum argue that nonborrowed reserves is abetter indicator ofmonetary policy than
total reserves because it eliminates theendogenous borrowing component fromtotal reserves. Also, their results
8
See Friedman (1959) and Waud (1970) for discussions ofthis view.
16using innovations to nonborrowed reservesor thefunds rateareso similar that thetwo measures are interchangeable
as policy indicators. Thissuggests that nonborrowed reserves can be used asa proxy for the funds rate. As support
fortheir view, they point outthat thereis aliquidity effect fornonborrowed reserves but not fortotalreserves.
Christiano and Eichenbaum’s finding has been challenged EColeman, Gilles andLabadie (1995) and Pagan and
Robertson (1995)]. Nevertheless, the adjusted monetary base, total reserves and nonborrowed reservesare all used
as indicators of monetary policy along with interestrates to test whether non-technical discountratechanges signal a
change in monetary policy.
A. Existing Evidence ofan Announcement ofa Change
in theFederal FundsRate Target
Cook and Hahn (1988) hypothesize that the market interprets a non-technical discount ratechangeas a
signal that the Fed has changed its targetfor the federal funds rate. Other short-term interest rates change with the
change in the funds ratein accordancewith theexpectations theory ofthe term structure. To testtheir hypothesis,
Cook and Hahn estimated the responseofthefederal funds and three-month Treasury-bill rates by estimating the
responseof these ratesover 91-and 182-dayperiods to non-technical changes in thediscount rate. Interpreting these
changes as permanent, they conclude that changes in the discountratesignal permanentchanges in the Fed’s target
for the federal funds rate.
Thornton(1994) has pointed out that in their analysis, thealternative hypothesis—discountratechanges
havea temporary effect on the level ofthe funds rate—is not feasible. Decomposing Cook and Hahn’s 91- and 182-
day changes in market rates into the initial one-day responseand the subsequentresponseThornton has shown that
all ofthe “permanent response” occurs immediately. Thornton argues that ifCook and Hahn’s interpretation were
correct, the responseofmarketinterest rates tochanges in thediscountrate should be fasterduring periods when the
Fed was directlytargeting the federal fundsratethan during periods when it is targeting funds rate“indirectly”, i.e.,
targeting either nonborrowed or borrowedreserves [Goodfriend (1991) and Thornton (1988)]. However, he shows
that theresponse to non-technical changes in thediscountrateoccurs immediately during both the directand indirect
targeting periods. Consequently, Cook and Hahn’s results provide no evidence of their hypothesis and further tests
do not support it.
17B. AdditionalEvidence ofan Announcement Effectofa Change
in theFederal FundsRate Target
It is possible to testthehypothesis that non-technicalchanges in thediscountratesignal changes in
monetary policy as reflected in the behaviorofthe federal funds ratewitha modified version ofCookand Hahn’s
hypothesis. Specifically, it is hypothesized thatnon-technical~changesin the discount rate signal changes in the Fed1s
path for the federal funds rate and, consequently, the path forother interestrates. For example, ifinterest rates have
been falling and the discountrateis raised, rates should rise. Ifrates have been rising and the discountrateis cut,
rates should fall. Interest rates typically drift up or down priorto achange in the discount rate in thesame direction,
however, so it is extremely unlikely that there will bereversals in the path of interest rates following discount rate
changes. It is possible, however, to testwhether non-technical changes in thediscount rate signal changes in the path
for the federal funds rate and otherrates by testing for asignificant shift in thedrift of interest rates before and after
non-technical discountratechanges. Thiscan bedone by estimating the equation
(12) i~i, = a + 13(L)z~i1, + Ô(L)AFR, + ‘b DRJFTk b + ~a DRIFTk +
where DRIFT~b is a dummy variable thattakeson the valueone k days before non-technical discount rate changes
and zero otherwise and DRIFT,~ is a dummy variable that takeson the valueone on the day ofa non-technical
discount rate change and k-i days afterthe changeand zero otherwise. Including theday ofthe discountratechange
announcement in the second drift variable forthe Treasury-bill rates isreasonable since the market’s reaction to
discount rate announcements should reflectexpectations forthe overnight rate. It could bias theresults in favor of
finding a significantshift in thedrift forthe federal fundsrate, however.
Estimates ofEquation 12 for the federal funds rate for four valuesof k,5, 10, 15 and 20, are reported in
Table 8. Because interestrates have drifted both up and down, thedrift variable is partitioned for positive and
negative changes in thediscount rate. In nearly every instance, the estimateddrift coefficients before non-technical
changes in the discountrate are correctly signed and arestatistically significant, confirming that the federal funds
rate moves in the direction of non-technical discount rate changes prior to the announcement. The results indicate a
significant shift in the drift ofthe federal fundsrate following non-technical discountratechanges in thesame
direction. The absolute valueof the estimated post-changedrift coefficient tends to get smaller as k increases,
18suggesting that the significant differencein thedrift coefficients could bedue tothe initial reaction ofmarkets tothe
discountrateannouncement.
To test this, thefundsrateequation wasreestimated for k days before and k days after non-technical ~
changes in thediscount rate. These results, reported in Table9, generallyconfirm the impression that the
significance in thechange in the trajectory for the funds rate, reported in Table 8, is strongly influenced by the
immediateresponseof the funds rate todiscóuntratechanges. Thenull hypothesisofno significant shift in thedrift
is rejected only fordiscountrateincreases and forsmall values of k. On net, theevidence for the overnightrate
supports the conclusion that non-technical changes in the discountrateare associated with an immediatechange in
the level ofthe funds rate, but no change in its trajectory.
Theresults for theTreasury-bill rates, presented in Table 10, also support theconclusion ofno significant
shift in the path for market rates. In virtually every instance, the estimateddrift coefficients for non-technical
discountratechanges are correctly signed and statistically significant atthe 5 percent level. Itis frequently the case
that the absolute value of theestimated post-changedrift coefficient becomes smaller rather than larger, as would be
thecase ifchanges in the discountratesignaleda change in thetrajectory forinterest rates. In anyevent, there was
only one instance when the null hypothesis ofno significant shift in thedrift was rejected and this was in the “wrong”
direction.’9 To theextent that changes in the path ofinterest rates are taken tobe an indicatorofchanges in the
stance of monetary policy, the lack of achange in the trajectory of interestrates suggeststhat non-technical discount
rate changes do not signal a change in thestance ofmonetary policy.
Similar testsfor a significant change in monetary policy were performed using the growth rates of reserve
aggregates—theadjusted monetary base, total reserves and nonborrowed reserves. Dataon the adjusted monetary
base areweekly, while thedataon total reserves adjusted for reserve requirementchanges and nonborrowed reserves
‘~The results for the federal funds andTreasury-bill rates aredifficult toreconcile with theexpectationstheoryof the termstructure. Goodfriend
(1991) and Cook andHahn (1988, 1989)arguethat thelonger-term billrates are equal to the holding-periodexpectationoftheovernightfunds rate.
Hence, it is reasonable that non-technicalchanges in thediscount ratepermanentlyraise thelevelsofboth rates. However, asignificantrise in the
levelofmarket rates shouldresult inasignificantchange in thetrajectoryofrates atshort horizons. Moreover,thepoint estimatesoftheresponse
ofthefunds andTreasury-bill rates to discount ratechangesare inconsistent with a strict interpretationoftheexpectationstheory andthis
explanation doesnot accountfor thesignificant drift in rates priorto discount ratechanges. An alternative hypothesis, predicated on the
observation that the federal funds rate tendsto followtheT-bill rates, e.g.,Garfinkel andThomton (1995), andthe factthat theFed appearsto make
discrete adjustments in itstarget for thefundsrate,is that theFed merely adjusts its fundsrate target to major swings in nominal interest rates that
the Fed itself is not responsible for. Still anotherconjectureis that non-technical discount ratechangesconfirm changesin theFed’spolicy toward
interestrates that hadbeen undertakenearlier. Neitherofthese hypothesesaccounts for the responseofinterestrates to non-technical discount rate
changes, however.
19are maintenance-period data—weeklyprior to February 1984 and bi-weekly thereafter. Changesin the growthrates
of these aggregates wereregressed on dummy variablesforfive weeks or five maintenance periods priorto and after
changes in the discountrate.2°
Though interesting, theresults, presented in Table 11,do not support the hypothesis that non-technical
discountratechanges signal achange in monetary policy. Forthe monetary base, all ofthe driftcoefficients are
statisticallysignificant, but the null hypothe~is of theequality ofthedrift coefficients is not rejected. Moreover, the
growth rateof themonetary baseaccelerates followingan increase in the discount rate rather than decelerate as
expected.
The results for nonborrowed reserves are in theanticipated direction, i.e., increases in the discountrateare
associated with decelerations in reserves growth and discountratecuts are associated with accelerations in reserve
growth, but thecoefficient estimates aregenerally not statistically significant. The results for total reservesare
similarto those ofnonborrowed reserves, except that change in the direction ofgrowth oftotal reserves is the wrong
sign in the caseofa discountrate increase.
While these results provide somequalitative support for the hypothesis that non-technical discount rate
changessignal a change in monetary policy, they do not provide statistical support forthis interpretation. Indeed, the
evidence suggests that ifeither changes inthe pathfor short-term interest rates or changes in the growth ratesof
narrow reserve aggregates are used asindicators ofmonetary policy, the hypothesis that non-technical discountrate
changes signal a changein monetary policy is rejected.
C. An Investigation ofFriedman’s Hypothesis
The rejection ofboth thedirect effectand thehypothesis that non-technical discountratechanges signal a
change in monetary policy necessarily leads to aconsideration of Friedman’s (1959) hypothesis. The problem is
Friedman’s hypothesis isnot specific. It does not identify the information the market is reacting to when the Fed
announces a non-technical discountratechange. Moreover, the precise wording of announcements varies
considerably from announcement to announcement,so it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the markets are not
20
These equationsalso included adistributed lag oforderS on thedependent variableand a time trend.
20responding to the same information each time. If this is thecase, however, Friedman’s hypothesis hasthe
implication that the market’sresponsewill varyfrom announcement to announcement.
To see how this possibility might be investigated, considerthe following specification forchanges in the
interestrate:
(13) txi1
= a + pL1DR~.,. + = 1, 2
wherep1~DR~, represents the responseofthe interestrate toa change in the discountrate on datet and ,denotes a
marketspecific or idiosyncratic shock. The parametera denotes the average responseof the interest ratetoother
general market shocksover the entireperiod. Equation 13 indicates that the variability ofrates on days when there
are no discount rate announcements is smallerthan on dayswhen there areannouncements.
Ifthe information contained in non-technical discountrate announcements is important, thechange in
interest rates on those days should be largerthan on other days, i.e., Ai,/o~ should belarge on announcementdays,
wherea~ is the standard error of the~i, on days when there were no discountratechanges. Moreover, since all
marketsshould respond simultaneously to discountrateannouncements, L~.i,/ci~ should be simultaneously large for all
interestrates unless the idiosyncratic shock in one particularmarket weresufficiently large to offset the reaction to
the news associated with adiscountratechange.
A convenient way to investigate this for each non-technical discount rate change is to estimate the equation:
(14) Ai, = a + 13(L)Ai,, + ô(L)LIFR, ++ 1’ t = 1, 2 T
whereZ, is a I x (N+1) vectorofobservations, Z, = (l,0,0,...4DR~,,0 0), and p is an (N+i) x 1 vectorof
parameters, p = (p,,...4tN). T denotes the number of marketdays less one in a given calendarperiod and N denotes
the number ofnon-technical discountratechanges (40). Equation 14 can bethought ofas theunconstrained version
of Equation 11, i.e., Equation 14 is identical to Equation 11 if the constraint P,=P2=~.~=PN is imposed.
The t-statisticfor each p~, j = 1, 2,..., N, is Ai,/OE.2’ Theestimates of M,/OE are presented in Table 12. One
striking feature ofthese results is the extent to which idiosyncratic shocks appearto dominate the information
2~
Thisprocedureis described more fully in Thornton (1989).
21containedinadiscountrateannouncement. Thereare comparatively few times when thereare largesimultaneous
responsesofthe four ratesto adiscountratechange. Indeed, there wereonly eightoccasionswhen the federal funds
and threeTreasury-bill rates responded by 1.5 standard errors or more to a given discountrateannouncement. This
suggests that theresponsetodiscountratechanges is frequentlysmall relativeto theidiosyncratic shocks in these
markets or perhaps it is thecasethat markets do not respond in an important way to all non-technical discountrate
changes.
These results suggest the possibility that the marketresponds to information containedin the announcement
rather than to thechange in the discountrateper Se. This would account for relativedearth ofsimultaneous
responses, thefactthat the magnitudeofthe responseappearsto vary significantly from announcement to
announcement and that some announcements, such as the one madeon October9, 1979 when the Fed simultaneously
announced it was shifting to a nonborrowed reserves operating procedure, seemto elicit a relatively largeresponsein
all rates. It would also account forthe lack ofresponseto technical discount rate changes: the markets do not react
to them because they convey no new information. On average, markets respond to non-technical discountrate
changes becauseon average they convey news, but theresponsevaries considerably from announcement to
announcementdepending on the news that the announcement contains.
IV. Conclusions
Aconsiderable volume ofempirical literature has established that markets react to changes in the Federal
Reserve’s discount rate and a number of alternative hypotheses for this reaction have been suggested. This paper
investigates thereaction ofthe federal funds rateand thethree-, six-, and 12-month Treasury-bill rates to changes in
the discount rate and presents theresults oftests designed to differentiate among competing hypotheses. The
evidence suggests that the market’sresponseis due simply to an announcementeffect. Theevidence rejects the
notion thatdiscountratechanges haveaquantitatively importanteffect on market interestrates becauseoftheir
direct effecton the supplyof money. Consequently, thesuggestion that theresponseto discountratechanges
necessarily varies with theFed’s operating procedure [Roley and Troll (1984) and Smirlock and Yawitz(1985)] is
rejected.
22Theevidence presented herealso rejects the notion that marketsdo not respond to technicaldiscountrate
changes because they areanticipated. Both technical and non-technicalchanges tend to follow, ratherthan lead, the
market and the exact timingofeither changecannotbe anticipated. Consequently, the evidence supports the notiozf~
that markets do not respond to technical discountratechanges simply becausetheir announcementprovides no
information, not because they were anticipated.
TheFed has given a variety ofexplanations for making non-technical changes in the discount rate, and
seldom makes a direct statement ofits policy intentions when announcing adiscount ratechange. Despite this fact, it
is often assumed that the marketresponds to such changes because they “signal” a change in monetary policy. Tests
ofthis hypothesis using both interestrates and reserve measuresprovide no support for it.
These results areonlysuggestive, however. Certainly, they cannotrule out the possibility that a particular
discountrate change conveyed information about monetary policy. Indeed, casual observation suggests that, at
times, discountratechanges convey such information. The most strikingexampleofsuch an announcement is the
one made in October 1979, when the Fed underscored its intent to fight inflation by announcing that it was raising
thediscountratea full percentage point and simultaneously announcing its shiftto a nonborrowed reservesoperating
procedure. This announcement was associated with a 225 basis-point change in the federal funds rateand 112, 94
and 90 basis-point changes in the three-, six-,and 12-month Treasury-bill rates, respectively. Moreover, this
announcementwas associated with adramaticchange in thegrowth ratesofreserves and the monetary base.
Events like these merely serveto illustrate what the evidence suggests, however, namely that markets
respond to information in the discountrateannouncement and not simply to the news that the discountrateis higher
or lower. A detailed analysis ofthe responseto individual discountratechanges indicates that often markets do not
appearto respond atall to non-technical discount ratechanges or that they do not respond simultaneously. This
suggests that the exactnature and anticipated usefulness ofthe information that suchannouncements provide varies
from announcement to announcement. While caution is required, it seems reasonable that identically worded
announcements couldengenderdifferent responsesdepending on the circumstances in the market at thetime. In
summary, the evidence suggests that the market’s reaction to a non-technical discountratechange is purely an
“announcement effect”, that the announcementeffect is invariant to the Fed’s operating procedures and that changing
23expectations about monetary policy is notthe only reason, indeed, itis notthe mostimportantreason, forthe
market’s reaction.
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Data plotted from January 1973 through January 1993, except for seasonal borrowings which begins in April 1973.Table 1: Discount RateChanges andAssociated ChangesinMarket Rates
Date1’ Classification ADR iWR ATB3 E~TB6 MB12
1/15173 T 0.50 0.125 0.03 0.01 0.03
2126173 M 0.50 0.375 0.21 0.19 0.15
4/23/73 T 0.25 -0.500 0.06 0.13 0.10
5/11173 T 0.25 0.187 0.23 0.16 0.09
6/11/73 M 0.50 0.188 0.08 0.09 0.06
7/2173 P 0.50 1.125 0.38 0.35 0.31
8/14/73 T 0.50 -0.150 0.23 0.12 0.01
4/25174 M 0.50 0.950 0.19 0.20 0.11
12/9/74 M -0.25 0.030 -0.18 -0.22 -0.23
1/6/75 P -0.50 -0.520 -0.06 -0.11 -0.11
2/Sr/S T -0.50 -1.740 -0.15 -0.13 -0.19
3/10/75 M -0.50 -0.100 0.06 0.00 0.01
5/16175 T -0.25 0.010 0.01 -0.08 -0.08
1/19/76 T -0.50 -0.030 -0.08 -0.08 -0.11
11/22/76 T -0.25 -0.060 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
8/30177 T 0.50 -0.010 0.02 0.01 0.01
10/26/77 T 0.25 0.110 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02
1/9/78 P 0.50 0.170 0.39 0,35 0.31
5/11178 T 0.50 0.040 -0.07 0.02 0.00
7/3178 T 0.25 -0.370 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
8/21/78 P 0.50 0.200 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05
9/22/78 M 0.25 0.010 0.11 0.15 0.11
10/16/78 M 0.50 0.110 0.06 0.19 0.14
11/1178 P 1.00 0.520 0.10 0.08 0.03
7/20179 M 0.50 0.200 0.16 0.12 0.06
8/17/79 P 0.50 -0.030 0.06 0.04 0.05
9/19179 T 0.50 -0.420 -0.20 -0.22 -0.13
10/9/79 P 1.00 2.250 1.12 0.94 0.90
2/15/80 P 1.00 0.370 0.57 0.58 0.55
5/29/80 T -1.00 -1.740 0.22 0.24 0.24
6/13/80 T -1.00 -0.040 -0.02 -0.19 -0.16
7/28/80 T -1.00 0.340 0.16 0.22 0.20
(more)Table 1 continued
Date” Classification ~DR AFR ATB3 ATB6 ATBI2
9/26/80 M 1.00 0.690 0.46 0.45 0.37
11/17/80 M 1.00 1.990 0.80 0.76 0.61
12/5/80 M 1.00 l.2’lO 0.98 0.39 0.21
5/5/81 M 1.00 -0.280 0.60 0.54 0.49
11/2/81 T -1.00 0.620 -0.06 -0.03 -0.09
12/4/81 T -1.00 -0.820 -0.58 -0.66 -0.62
7/20/82 M -0.50 -0.870 -0.40 -0.25 -0.32
8/2/82 M -0.50 -0.580 -0.81 -0.62 -0.48
8/16/82 M .0.50 -0.470 -0.58 -0.42 -0.35
8127/82 T -0.50 0.550 0.70 0.57 0.58
10/12/82 T -0.50 -0.430 -0.37 -0.52 -0.47
11/22/82 M -0.50 -0.270 -0.14 -0.06 -0.07
12/14/82 P -0.50 -0.440 -0.32 -0.37 -0.30
4/9/84 T 0.50 -0.050 -0.09 -0.03 -0.05
11/23/84 P -0.50 -0.350 -0.10 -0.11 -0.07
12/24/84 M -0.50 -0.530 -0.13 -0.03 -0.06
5120/85 M -0.50 -0.250 -0.14 -0.16 -0.22
3/7/86 M -0.50 -0.270 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06
4/21/86 T -0.50 0.290 0.00 0.04 0.03
7/11/86 T -0.50 -0.310 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10
8/21/86 P -0.50 -0.300 -0.13 -0.14 -0.11
9/4/~7 P o.so 0.010 0.19 0.24 0.12
8/9/88 M 0.50 -0.050 0.22 0.16 0.10
2/24/89 p o.so 0.190 0.04 0.13 0.03
12/19/90 M -0.50 -0.240 -0.11 -0.13 -0.12
2/1/91 p -o.so -1.880 -0.19 -0.23 -0.22
4/30/91 M -0.50 0.050 -0.08 -0.14 -0.14
9/13/91 M -0.50 -0.220 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03
11/6/91 M -0.50 -0.190 -0.13 -0.11 -0.08
12/20/91 M -1.00 -0.490 -0.30 -0.29 -0.26
7/2/92 P -0.50 -0.430 -0.31 -0.29 -0.32
1~ Indicatesthe datethat market rates responded tothe discount rate change--not the day ofthe announcement.Table 2: Average Absolute Change in Market InterestRates Over Different OperatingProcedures
Sub-Periods E~FR i~TB3 AT136 ATB12
1/3/72-10/8/79 0.213 0.068 0.058 0.053
10/9/79-10/11/82 0.591 0.212 0.188 0.160
10/12/82-1/29/93 ~0.195 0.048 0.049 0.047Table3: TestsfortheEqualityofResponseOverDifferent OperatingProcedures

























































R2 0.09 1 0,060 0.054 0.048
Fg~=ji2~ 9.421* 20.611* 12.800* 15.093*






1/3/72 - 5/13/73 0.198 0.059 0.059 0.053
5/14173-4/30/75 0.274 0.171 0.128 0.107
511175 - 1017/79 0.117 0.079 0.063 0.063
10/8/79- 10/5/82 0.638 0.268 0.239 0.204
10/6/82 - 12/11/90 0.207
12/12/90- 3/28/91 0.527
3/29/91 - 1/29/93 0.169
10/6/82 - 1/29/93 0.07 1 0.072 0.068
(more)Table 3 (continued)

























































P12 0.112 0.063 0.056 0.046
F ~~ i
2~ 0.038 0.100 1.765 0.046
F~t2~.=p?~,. 0.635 11.961* 15.939* 8.204*
* Indicates statistical significanceat the 5 percent level. Absolute value oft-statistics inparentheses.Table 4: Results ofDirectTestsfor the PredictabilityofTechnical and Non-
Technical DiscountRate Changes
Technical Non-Technical
Const. ~0.0l2* (3.78) -0.007 (1.47)
Spread~.1 0.022* (3.26) 0.038* (4.02)
Spread~,2 ~0.025* (2.69) -0.008 (0.62)
Spread~ 0.032* (3.49) -0.023 (1.80)
Spread~ .0.022* (3.15) 0.002 (0.21)
Bon~1
0.009 (1.22) 0.008 (0.72)
Borr~,2 0.022* (2.69) -0.004 (0.38)
Borr1.3 0.016 (1.91) -0.003 (0.30)









51 0 1 5
FR Technical 0.842 0.879 1.106
Non-Technical 0.438 3.063* 2.511*
TB3 Technical 1.966 1.739 2,025*
Non-Technical 10.181* 5433* 4.083*
TB6 Technical 3.352* 2.692* 2.796*
Non-Technical 10.438* 5.904* 4.331*
TBI2 Technical 3.695* 2.832* 3.034*
Non-Technical 11.447* 6.559* 4735*
1’F-statisticfor atest of thenull hypothesis that all ofthe coefficientsexcept the
constant are zero.
* Indicates statistical significance atthe 5 percent level. Absolutevalue oft-
statisticsin parentheses.Table 5: Response to “Pure” and “Mixed” Non-Technical Discount Rate Chanaes

























P12 0.089 0.057 0.055 0.047




First and lastdays of the
year 1.650
‘
1/3/72-5/13/73 0.197 0.059 0.059 0.054
5/14/73-4/30/75 0.272 0.171 0.128 0.107
5/1175-10/7/79 0.119 0.080 0.064 0.064




10/6/82-1/29/93 0.071 0.07 1 0.068
* Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percentlevel. Absolutevalue oft-statistics in parentheses.
‘~ F Test ofthenull hypothesis that ~ =Table6: Estimates oftheDemandforBorrowed Reserves
Adjustment BorrowingEquation SeasonalBorrowingEquation






































SE 0.290 0.172 0.023 0.024
* Indicates statistical signifIcance atthe 5 percent level. Absolute valueoft-statistics in parentheses.
Theseequatioas were estimatesusingan exact(Prais-Winsten) AR adjustment. Thatis ~, = + 02 ~2 +U~.Table 7: TheResponse toNon-Technil Discount RateChanges, Pre-and Post-June 1984

























P12 0.089 0.058 0.055 0.047





1stand lastdays ofyear 1.650
1/3/72-5/13/73 0.197 0.059 0.059 0.054
5/14/73-4/30175 0.273 0.171 0.129 0.107
5/1175-1017/79 0.120 0.080 0.064 0.064




10/6/82-1129/93 0.07 1 0.07 1 0.067
1’ F-statisticfora testofthenull hypothesisthat Pre-June = Post-June.
* Indicates statisticalsignificance atthe5 percent level. Absolute valueoft-statistic in parentheses.Table8: Testsfora Shift in theDrift ofthe’Federal FundsRate
Parameter ~FR









































P12 0.092 0.097 0.095 0.095
F(Pos) 15.153* 11.737* 6.668* 3.078
F(Neg) 4.409* 2.814 3.446 3.896*
stimated Standard Errors
SettlementWed.fThur. 0.634 0.634 0.636 0.636
1st/lastdayofyear 1.653 1.652 1.649 1.707
1/3/72-5/13/73 0.193 0.196 0.197 0.201
5/14173-4/29/75 0.275 0.276 0.273 0.274
4/30/75-10/7/79 0.123 0.121 0.120 0.120
10/8/79-10/5/82 0.640 0.640 0.644 0.646
10/6/82-12/11/90 0.209 0.209 0.209 0.208
12/12/90-3/28/91 0.523 0.526 0.529 0.534
3/29/91-1/29/93 0.174 0.171 0.170 0.171
10/6/82-1/29/93
* Indicatesstatistical significanceat the 5 percent level. Absolute valueoft-
statistics in parentheses.Table9: FurtherTestsfora Shift intheDrift ofthe FederalFt1’I~IdSRate
Parameter L~FR









































P12 0.086 0.091 0.090 0.092
F(Pos) 11.068* 6.300* 2.209 1.139
F(Neg) 0.059 0.406 0.684 1.537
Estimated StandardErrors
Settlement Wed.[fhur. 0.635 0.634 0.636 0.636
lst/lastdayofyear 1.653 1.652 1.650 1.707
1/3/72-5/13/73 0.197 0.197 0.200 0.202
5/14173-4/29/75 0.280 0.277 0.274 0.275
4/30175-1017/79 0.117 0.120 0.118 0.118
10/8179-10/5/82 0.651 0.647 0.649 0.649
10/6/82-12/11/90 0.209 0.209 0.209 0.208
12/12/90-3/28/91 0.539 0.536 0.536 0.538
3/29/91-1/29/93 0.173 0.172 0.171 0.172
* Indicates statistical significance atthe 5 percent level. Absolute value oft-statisticsin parentheses.Table 10: Tests fora Shift in the Drift ofthe 1-Bill Rates
Parameter i~TB3 ~TB6 ATB 12
.~



























































































































0.041 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.034
F(Pos) 1.353 0.339 0.132 0.078 0.225 0.158 0.333 0.413 4.211* 3.357 0.519 0.259
F(Neg) 0.132 0.071 0.115 0.217 0.911 0.255 0.722 0.007 0.694 0.137 1.062 0.027
Estimated StandardErrors
1/3/72-5/13/73 0.060 0.060 0.061 0.060 0.059 0.060 ‘ 0.059 0.059 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.053
5/14173-4/30/75 0.171 0.172 0.172 0.171 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108
5/1/75-10/7/79 0.080 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063
10/8/79-10/5/82 0.274 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.243 0.244 0.244 0.244 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.208
10/6/82-1/29/93 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068

































P12 0.322 0.235 0.066
F(Pos) 0.469 0.013 0.010
F(Neg) 1.551 0.134 0.002
* Indicatesstatistical significanceat the 5 percent level. Absolute valueoft-statistics
inparentheses.Table 12: Estimatesof1~i/o,, forNon-technicalDiscountRate Changes
DiscountRate Change ~FR L~TB3 i~TB6 ATB12
2/26/73 1.995* 35()4* 3.221* 2.605*
6/11/73 0.805 0.489 0.654 0.530
7/2/73 4.361* 1.957* 2.388* 2.515*
4/25/74 1.430 ~0.936 1.414 0.925
12/9/74 0.157 0.902 1.744* 2.100*
1/6/75 1.862* -0.050 0.662 0.853
3/10175 0.488 -0.356 0.037 -0.085
1/9/78 1.180 4.963* 5.581* 4.851*
8/21/78 2.050* -0.596 -0.446 -0.948
9/22/78 0.325 1.463 2.389* 1.723*
10/16/78 0.756 0.742 3.034* 2.188*
11/1/78 0.916 1.004 0.628 0.078
7/20/79 1.966* 1.920* 1.791* 0.828
8/17/79 0.383 0.776 0.625 0.690
10/9179 3.578* 3.962* 3,694* 4.165*
2/15/80 0.699 1.874* 2.116* 2.393*
9/26/80 l.288 1.445 1.624* 1.563*
11/17/80 3.207* 2.746* 2.813* 2.615*
1215/80 2.295w’ 3.42 1* 1.504* 0.909
5/5/81 0.082 1.775* 1.669* 1.946*
7/20/82 1.820* 1.441 0.788 1.273
8/2/82 0.854 2.849* 2.406* 2.181*
8/16/82 0.858 1.937* 1.478 1,510*
11/22/82 1.755* 1.439 0.334 0.671
12/14/82 2.030* 4.507* 5.028* 4.250*
11/23/84 0.592 l.095 1.044 0.546
12/24184 2.809* 1.748* 0.220 0.720
5/20/85 1.174 1.999* 2.248* 3.257*
3/7/86 1.498 0.822 0.903 0.605
8/21/86 1.586* 1.657* 1.836* 1.455
9/4/87 0.054 2.451* 344~* 1.560*
8/9/88 -0.140 3.175* 2.267* 1.437
(more)Table 12 continued
DiscountRateChange AFR ~TB3 ~TB6 L~TB12
2/24/89 1.198 0.316 1.570* 0.131
12/19/90 0.456 1.416 1.734* 1.667*
2/1/91 3.367* 2.389* 2.889* 2.950*
4/30/91 -0.306 ‘1.ll8 1.992* 2.119*
9/13/91 1.396 0.727 0.602 0.3 19
11/6/91 1:158 1.815* 1.584* 1.226
12/20/91 2.762* 3.938* 3.843* 3.699*
7/2/92 2.552* 4.274* 4Q59* 4.694*
EstimatedStandardErrors
Variable
Subsample t~FR LiTB3 z~TB6 ATB12
Settlement Wed, and Thurs. 0.637
Firstandlast dayofyear 1.651
1/3/72 - 5113/73 0.197 0.059 0.059 0.054
5/14/73-4/30/75 0.269 0.170 0.128 0.106
511/75 - 10/7/79 0.115 0.078 0.062 0.062
10/8/79 - 10/5/82 0.630 0.267 0.239 0.203
10/6/82-12/11/90 0.207
12/12/90 -3/28/91 0.504
3/29/91 - 1/29/93 0.167
1016/82 - 1/29/93 0.071 0.071 0.067
* Indicates t-statistic 1.50.